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It is a great honor for me to participate in this symposium on
outsourcing authority and to share the podium with such
luminaries as Mark Tushnet, Ken Kersch, Susan Karamanian, John
Baker, and John McGinnis. Albany Law School has been a
wonderful host and sponsor of this symposium. It has chosen a
felicitous name to address a theme that is one of the more
interesting in current discussions about constitutional
interpretation.
As a skeptic of constitutional comparativism, I come to the debate
from a surprising background. Most skeptics of the use of
constitutional comparativism are not steeped in international law
and do not describe themselves as international law scholars. But I,
on the other hand, received my L.L.M. in international law from the
University of Edinburgh, worked in international tribunals on two
previous occasions in two European countries, and practiced public
and private international law in Washington, D.C. The better part
of my professional career has focused on international law.
Accordingly, my skepticism is not about international law per se,
but rather about the misuse of international law.
Much of my skepticism pertains to my sense of how constitutional
decision-making should be undertaken.' But it also relates to my
understanding of the purpose of international law. International
law functions best as a bracketed discipline that recognizes its own
limits. When international law overreaches, it is met with deep
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, California. B.A.
Baylor University, 1985; M. Div. Southern Seminary, 1988; J.D. New York University, 1991;
LLM. University of Edinburgh, 1992.
' See generally Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REv. 639 (2005) [hereinafter In Search of a Theory] (arguing that the methodology of
constitutional comparativism should be evaluated in light of constitutional theory).
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skepticism. The frequent refrain I hear from lay skeptics about
Lawrence v. Texas2 and Roper v. Simmons3 is "what possible
relevance does some modern international treaty have for judges
trying to interpret the text of our Constitution which was adopted
over 200 years ago?" The criticism reflects a quite respectable and
strong impression that international law is arrogantly overreaching,
transgressing its proper role as a bracketed discipline.
If you will allow an imperfect analogy, the discipline of science
functions so marvelously well because it focuses on discrete
scientific questions and eschews metaphysical questions. Of course,
no scientist lives in a philosophical or ethical vacuum, but the hard
sciences are successful because they have the discipline to focus on
scientific questions.
The renowned theoretical physicist John Polkinghorne has
written much about this intersection between the physical and the
metaphysical world.' On the interaction between science and
religion, he writes that science and religion are "partners in the
great human quest to understand reality."5 He then suggests that
there are varieties of interaction that might arise between the two
disciplines, including conflict,6  independence,7  dialogue,8
integration, 9 consonance,' ° and assimilation.1' These interactions
represent a spectrum of possible relationships in the ongoing debate
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4 See generally JOHN POLKINGHORNE, FAITH, SCIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING (2000); JOHN
POLKINGHORNE, BELIEF IN GOD IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE (1998); JOHN POLKINGHORNE, QUARKS,
CHAOS & CHRISTIANITY: QUESTIONS TO SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1996); JOHN POLKINGHORNE,
REASON AND REALITY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY (1991).
JOHN POLKINGHORNE, SCIENCE AND THEOLGY: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (1998).
6 Conflict "occurs when either discipline threatens to take over the legitimate concerns of
the other. Examples would be scientism (the assertion that the only meaningful questions to
ask or possible to answer are scientific questions .. ,) or biblical literalism." Id.
7 Independence "treats science and theology as being quite separate realms of enquiry in
which each discipline is free to pursue its own way without reference to, or hindrance by, the
other." Id. at 21.
' Dialogue is "a recognition that science and theology have things to say to each other
about phenomena in which their interests overlap," such as "the nature of the human person
and the relationship between mind and body." Id.
9 Integration is "more ambitious, for it encourages the unification of science and theology
into a single discourse." Id.
'o Consonance posits that "[s]cience and theology retain their due autonomies in their
acknowledged domains, but the statements they make must be capable of appropriate
reconciliation with each other in overlap regions." Id. at 22.
11 Assimilation is "an attempt to achieve the maximum possible conceptual merging of




about the intersection of science and religion.
I find Polkinghorne's taxonomy useful in the current debate about
outsourcing authority. One might say that with the growing
prominence of international law and the proliferation of global
constitutionalism, we are struggling to understand the interaction
between our own cherished constitutional liberties and the growing
body of international and global constitutional law. In short, the
question to be raised is how do we understand constitutional law in
an international age?
In my view, we need not embrace the most hostile approach of
conflict or independence. We could and should have fruitful, good-
faith dialogue between international law and constitutional law.
The two disciplines are largely harmonious, for obviously the
treaties we sign and the Constitution we honor are not incongruous.
Likewise, our tradition of affording constitutional protections
informs the content of our state practice under customary
international law. Nor can you understand certain constitutional
provisions, such as the "declare war" clause, without an
appreciation for international or comparative law.2
But in my view, we should avoid the current, more extreme efforts
at deeper interaction. At bottom, international law and
constitutional law use different methods, ask different questions,
and find answers in different source material. In short, they
explain different spheres of legal epistemology. The two disciplines
may inform one another on the margins, but the goal should not be
integration (unifying international and constitutional law into a
single discourse), consonance (reconciling the two disciplines in
overlapping regions), or assimilation (attempting the maximum
possible conceptual merging of international and constitutional
law). It is a grievous error to share Justice Blackmun's longing for a
"day when the majority of the Supreme Court will inform almost all
of its decisions almost all of the time with a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind."'3
Thus, the debate about outsourcing authority is ultimately one
about the appropriate interaction between these two legal
disciplines. My strong sense is that there is a sharp distinction that
2 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 125 (1814) ("In expounding th[e] constitution, a
construction ought not lightly to be admitted which would give to a declaration of war an
effect in this country it does not possess elsewhere .... ).




needs to be maintained, and that distinction broadly explains my
own skepticism about constitutional comparativism.
This brings us to the current discussion about the debate itself.
Thus far my participation in the discussion of constitutional
comparativism has focused on the substance of the dispute. 4 This
article is a departure from the norm for me, and will focus on the
contours of the debate itself. Having followed the subject closely
since first reading a footnote in Atkins v. Virginia in June 2002 that
discussed the world community's opinion on the death penalty for
mentally retarded offenders, 5 I have seen the discussion explode on
the legal scene following the decisions in Lawrence v. Texas 6 and
Roper v. Simmons.
17
The purpose of this Article is to discuss common mistakes in the
current debate on outsourcing authority. Those mistakes pertain to
(1) confusion about the voices in the debate, (2) underestimation of
the genuine novelty of the current practice of outsourcing authority,
(3) ignorance of the key distinction between using foreign authority
in constitutional and statutory interpretation, and (4)
misunderstandings about the likely outcomes of robust
constitutional comparativism. This Article will focus on mistakes
about voices, history, statutes, and outcomes.
II. THE MISTAKE ABOUT VOICES
The first mistake in the debate on outsourcing authority is about
the protagonists. Given the prominence of the Breyer-Scalia
14 See generally Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use
and Abuse of Charming Betsy (2006) [hereinafter Foreign Relations as a Matter of
Interpretation] (unpublished article, on file with Albany Law Review) (arguing against the
use of a constitutional Charming Betsy doctrine); Roger P. Afford, Roper v. Simons and Our
Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Roper v.
Simmons and Our Constitution] (discussing the use of comparativism in Roper and the
consequences of this approach); In Search of a Theory, supra note 1; Roger P. Alford, Federal
Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v.
Texas, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 913 (2004) (examining the possible increase in deference to human
rights tribunals after Lawrence); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret
the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004) [hereinafter Misusing International Sources]
(examining the potential misuse of international materials in constitutional adjudication);
Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 675 (2003) [hereinafter International Tribunals] (advocating the use of specific
methods of deference to international materials, depending upon the tribunal).
"S 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
16 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
" 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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debates, 8 there is a tendency to assume that this discussion
revolves around a few Supreme Court Justices who are simply
singing a new verse to an old tune about the propriety of
originalism. But to focus solely on the fact that Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer espouse this approach,'9 while Justices Scalia and
Thomas do not,2° distorts the true picture of the rich debate that is
ongoing at the bar, the bench, the academy, and beyond. Mistaking
the voices in the debate will distort what is at issue in the
discussion.
The reality is much more complex. On the bench, the voices are
far from predictable. A pragmatist like Justice Breyer embraces
comparativism,2' while a pragmatist like Judge Posner vehemently
does not.22  Justice Scalia is an outspoken (and surprising)
proponent of comparativism to understand the shared meaning of a
treaty,23 despite his truculent refusal to rely on foreign experiences
in the constitutional context.24  In extra-judicial writings, Justice
O'Connor often expresses strong support for comparative
references, 25 but in her opinions she has proven to be far more
conservative. In Roper, for example, she stated that international
opinions should not play a confirmatory role in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence because there is no American consensus on the
issue.26 In McCreary County v. ACLU, she went further and
articulated a presumption against comparativism in First
Amendment jurisprudence: "[t]hose who would renegotiate the
boundaries between church and state must therefore answer a
difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us
so well for one that has served others so poorly?' 27 Not so long ago
1" See generally The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L.
519 (2005) [hereinafter Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials] (reporting the views of Justices
Scalia and Breyer on the issue of foreign law citation in a dialogue format).
'9 See id. at 522-24; John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
303, 305 (2006).
20 See Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials, supra note 18, at 528, 533-34.
21 In Search of a Theory, supra note 1, at 694-98.
22 Id. at 694-95, 698.
23 See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that in the context of interpreting a modern treaty "[f]oreign constructions are
evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting parties").
24 Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials, supra note 18, at 521.
25 See generally Sandra Day O'Conner, Commentary, Broadening Our Horizons: Why
American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20, 21.
26 543 U.S. 551, 604-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy appeared to be a comparative skeptic,28 while Chief
Justice Rehnquist was thought to be warming to the trend.29 Recent
years have shown them to be precisely the opposite.3 ° The thinking
of both evolved, but in different directions.
In the academy, wonderful scholars on the left and right are
steeped in the debate. Outspoken proponents include eminent
scholars such as Harold Koh, Mark Tushnet, Gerald Neuman, Vicki
Jackson, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Michel Rosenfeld, and Jeremy
Waldron. These authors make a variety of arguments in favor of
comparativism, including Slaughter's arguments for judicial cross-
fertilization,3 ' Neuman's advocacy of suprapositive
constitutionalism,32  Waldron's arguments for a modern ius
gentium,33 Jackson's arguments for comparative engagement,34
" See Tony Mauro, Visiting Justices Get an Earful in London, LEGAL TIMES, July 31, 2000,
at 10, 10 [hereinafter Visiting Justices]; Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. The World, USA
TODAY, June 20, 2005, at 15A [hereinafter U.S. Supreme Court].
29 See William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts--Comparative Remarks, reprinted in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 412 (Paul Kirchoff & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
3 See Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of
Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 301, 346 (2004); U.S. Supreme
Court, supra note 28.
31 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 191, 201-
02 (2003). Slaughter observed that
For [Supreme Court Justices], looking abroad simply helps them do a better job at home,
in the sense that they can approach a particular problem more creatively or with greater
insight. Foreign authority is persuasive because it teaches them something they did not
know or helps them see an issue in a different and more tractable light....
Increasing cross-fertilization of ideas and precedents among constitutional judges around
the world is gradually giving rise to a visible international consensus on various issues-
a consensus that, in turn, carries compelling weight.
Id.
32 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 87 (2004).
From the suprapositive perspective, the interpretive value of international human rights
norms and decisions derives from the normative insight that they provide. The
interpreter should carefully examine whether the international conception of the right
(or the feature at issue) rests primarily on consensual or institutional factors rather than
on normative considerations, and whether its normative foundations are compatible with
the basic assumptions of the U.S. constitutional system.
Id. (footnote omitted).
" See generally Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (2005) (arguing that ius gentium, or the law of nations, provides a theory to justify
the practice of using foreign law).
' See Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 116-18 (2005) [hereinafter Constitutional Comparisons]
(maintaining that engaging foreign and international law may assist in questioning our own
understanding of the U.S. Constitution by (1) comparing the consequences of different
[Vol. 69
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Koh's argument for transnational legal process,35  Rosenfeld's
arguments about the primacy of judicial fairness,36 and Tushnet's
argument for judicial bricolage.37 All of the scholars seek to
legitimize the reference of comparative experiences in constitutional
interpretation and discount the concerns that others have expressed
about this trend.
Critics include heavy-weights such as Richard Posner, Charles
Fried, Ernest Young, Daniel Halberstam, Mary Ann Glendon,
Robert Bork, Jed Rubenfeld, Michael Ramsey, and Kenneth
Anderson. These authors make a variety of arguments, including
Posner's concern about "promiscuous" persuasive authority,38
Young's concern about the "denominator problem,"39 Fried's concern
about expanding the constitutional canon,4 ° Bork's concern about a
interpretive approaches, (2) clarifying "the distinctive function of one's own system;" and (3)
illuminating the dimensions of the universal constitutional rights).
31 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2371
(1991). Two distinct characteristics of the transnational legal process are (1) "a prospective
focus" that concentrates on asserting transnational norms and (2) the ability to strategically
transport norms to other forums during litigation. Id. (emphasis omitted).
36 See Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States:
Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 633, 649 (2004). While constitutional
adjudication relies on
precedents as part of its common law methodology, [it] must ultimately be faithful to the
constitutional provision involved rather than to the precedents. As a result, when
precedents appear patently unfair or circumstances have changed significantly, the U.S.
Supreme Court is empowered-perhaps obligated pursuant to its constitutional
function-to overrule precedent, thus putting fairness above predictability.
Id.
37 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1300 (1999) ("Thinking about constitution-making as a process of bricolage casts doubt
on a form of textualism that attributes to the constitution's writers a purpose of creating a
tightly integrated document governed by a form of conceptual determinism.")
38 See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 85-86 (2005)
[hereinafter A Political Court] ("One objection to the search [for international consensus] is
the promiscuous opportunities that relying on foreign decisions opens up .... If foreign
decisions are freely citable, any judge wanting a supporting citation has only to troll deeply
enough in the world's corpora juris to find it."); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have
Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 40, 41 ("The... problem with according even
limited precedential weight to foreign or international decisions is the promiscuous
opportunities that are opened up .... ).
" See generally Ernest A. Young, Comment, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem,
119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005). Young argues that
The size of the denominator matters in constitutional cases, and therefore the Court's
inclusion of foreign jurisdictions in that denominator matters as well. Whether one
ultimately concludes that domestic practices should be measured against a national or
an international "consensus," the Court's foreign citations should not be defended by
downplaying their significance.
Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
40 See Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
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global bill of rights,41 Glendon's concern about judicial tourism, 42
Rubenfeld's concern about democratic constitutionalism, 43 Ramsey's
concern about comparative empiricism,44  Halberstam's concern
about institutional dynamics,45  Anderson's concern about
constitutional provenance,46 and, not to mention, my own concern
807, 819 (2000). Fried argues that while
Justice Breyer's foray [in Printz v. United States] was an attempt (probably not
successful-at least not this time) to expand the universe of relevant legal materials to
include the structures and judgments of other constitutional systems[,] [t]he dispute is
particularly striking because it would be one of the few instances of a deliberate attempt
by a Justice to expand the canon of authoritative materials from which constitutional
common law reasoning might go forward.
Id.
"' See Robert H. Bork, Travesty Time, Again: In Its Death-Penalty Decision, the Supreme
Court Hits a New Low, NAT'L REV., Mar. 28, 2005, at 17, 18 (arguing that "[w]hat is really
alarming about [Roper v. Simmons] and other cases citing foreign law... is that the Court, in
tacit coordination with foreign courts, is moving toward a global bill of rights.... It hardly
matters what particular constitutions say or were understood to mean by those who adopted
them").
42 See Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14 (arguing
that "[w]hat has been overlooked in these debates is the crucial difference between the
legitimate use of foreign material as mere empirical evidence that legislation has a rational
basis, and its use to buttress the Court's own decision to override legislation").
41 See Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1971, 1999 (2004). Rubenfeld argues that
[diemocratic constitutionalism regards constitutional law as embodying a particular
nation's fundamental, democratically self-given legal and political commitments. At any
given moment, these commitments operate as checks and constraints on national
democratic will, but in its creation and over time, constitutional law is not anti-national,
and it is emphatically not antidemocratic. Rather, it aims at democracy over time.
Hence it is critical for constitutional law to be made and interpreted not by international
experts, but by national political actors and judges.
Id.
" See Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on
Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 77-79 (2004) [hereinafter International Materials
and Domestic Rights]. Ramsey argues that while "[e]mbracing international materials also
entails a commitment to serious empirical research... [i]f we (and the Court) cannot bring
ourselves to do the empirical project right, that seems further evidence that we are in it only
for the results." Id. at 77, 79. See generally Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of
International Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1243 (2004) (discussing the problems and
disadvantages of empirical investigation in international law).
" See Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in
THE FEDERAL VISION 213, 216-17, 249-51 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001)
(discussing critical flaws in Justice Breyer's analysis of structural comparativism in Printz v.
United States); see also Young, supra note 39, at 166 (agreeing with Halberstam that Justice
Breyer failed to consider the institutional dynamics that may result in different outcomes in
the United States and Europe).
46 See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1307 (2005)
[hereinafter Squaring the Circle] (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004)). Anderson argues that "[clonstitutions are unique insofar as they are the constitutive
document of a political community. As such, the issue is not so much the content of doctrine
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about the international counter-majoritarian difficulty.47  The
concerns of these scholars reflect varied reasons for disquiet
regarding the trend toward constitutional comparativism.
What is perhaps most remarkable, however, is that this debate
has now spilled over into contemporary political parlors, with
politicians and pundits expressing strong opinions about the trend.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez has openly criticized the use of
constitutional comparativism, contending that reliance on foreign
authority undermines the Court's legitimacy, usurps the role of the
political branches, and creates serious advocacy problems for
litigators appearing before the Court.48 In the Senate, Supreme
Court nominees are grilled on their views of the trend, with Chief
Justice Roberts49 and Justice Alito5° recently testifying that each
but instead its provenance-the fact that it comes out of the constitutional and constitutive
processes of a particular community." Id. (footnote omitted).
41 Misusing International Sources, supra note 14, at 59.
The difficulty for international majoritarians is that, while certain constitutional
provisions have been interpreted to embrace community standards, those standards have
been interpreted consistently with-not counter to-majoritarian values reflected in our
national experience. The international countermajoritarian difficulty would suggest that
international norms cannot be internalized within our Constitution unless such norms
are first internalized by our people as our community standards. That is, international
standards cannot serve as community standards unless they reflect our own national
experience. To conclude otherwise would grant countermajoritarian international norms
constitutional relevance as a community standard.
Id.
48 Alberto R. Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto
R. Gonzales at the University of Chicago Law School (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ag-speech_0511091.html [hereinafter Prepared
Remarks of Attorney General].
49 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). During his
confirmation hearing, Roberts observed that
there are a couple of things that cause concern on my part about the use of foreign law as
precedent.... The first has to do with democratic theory. Judicial decisions: In this
country, judges, of course, are not accountable to the people, but we are appointed
through a process that allows for participation of the electorate.
If we're relying on a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means,
no president accountable to the people appointed that judge and no Senate accountable
to the people confirmed that judge. And yet he's playing a role in shaping the law that
binds the people in this country.... The other part of it that would concern me is that,
relying on foreign precedent doesn't confine judges. It doesn't limit their discretion the
way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can confine and shape the
discretion of the judges. Foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't find
it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or
Indonesia or wherever. As somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for
support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them.
They're there. And that actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge
Albany Law Review [Vol. 69
had deep skepticism about the use of foreign authority in
constitutional interpretation. In the House of Representatives,
there are thirty-eight members who have sponsored and co-
sponsored a resolution stating "it is the sense of the House of
Representatives that judicial interpretations regarding the meaning
of the Constitution ... should not be based in whole or in part on
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions."'" Some
members are so infuriated by the practice that they are
investigating the foreign travels of the justices52 and even going so
to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the authority of
precedent-because they're finding precedent in foreign law-and use that to determine
the meaning of the Constitution.
Id.
50 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing] (statement of Samuel Alito). In response to a Senator's
question as to whether the Supreme Court should use foreign law, Alito said:
Well, I don't think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own Constitution. I
agree with you that the laws of the United States consist of the Constitution and treaties
and laws and, I would add, regulations that are promulgated in accordance with law.
And I don't think that it's appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in interpreting the
provisions of our Constitution. I think the framers would be stunned by the idea that the
Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the countries of the world. The
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to give Americans rights that were recognized
practically nowhere else in the world at the time. The framers did not want Americans
to have the rights of people in France or the rights of people in Russia or any of the other
countries on the continent of Europe at the time. They wanted them to have the rights of
Americans. And I think we should interpret our Constitution-we should interpret our
Constitution. And I don't think it's appropriate to look to foreign law. I think that it
presents a host of practical problems that have been pointed out. You have to decide
which countries you are going to survey. And then it's often difficult to understand
exactly what you are to make of foreign court decisions. All countries don't set up their
court systems the same way. Foreign courts may have greater authority than the courts
of the United States. They may be given a policy-making role. And, therefore, it would
be more appropriate for them to weigh in on policy issues. When our Constitution was
being debated, there was a serious proposal to have members of the judiciary sit on a
council of revision, where they would have a policy-making role before legislation was
passed. And other countries can set up their judiciary in that way. So you'd have to
understand the jurisdiction and the authority of the foreign courts. And then sometimes
it's misleading to look to just one narrow provision of foreign law without considering the
larger body of law in which it's located. If you focus too narrowly on that, you may
distort the big picture. So for all those reasons, I just don't think that's a useful thing to
do.
Id.
5 H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).
52 Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 44.
[I]n August [2005], Representative Steve King, a Republican from Iowa, completed an
investigation of the Justices' foreign trips, based on the disclosure forms that they are
required to file. "Between 1998 and 2003, the Justices took a total of ninety-three
foreign trips". And the implication is that there are at least a couple of Justices,
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far as to openly and controversially suggest that one or more
justices should be impeached. 3 These congressional and executive
leaders are obviously making much ado about something.
The debate is not limited to Washington political circles. It has
now reached the broader public marketplace. Most vocal in the
debate are movement conservatives that view the trend toward
reliance on foreign authority as another example of "judges
reflect[ing] a secular, liberal elite [who] are making rulings...
contrary to the will of the majority of Americans."54  But it is far
more complex than criticism from the right. National newspapers
and magazines have addressed the topic of reliance on foreign
authority, and public intellectuals are divided on the question.5
The topic has received attention in major national newspapers and
magazines such as The Atlantic Monthly,56 The New Republic,57
First Things,58 Policy Review,5 9 The Nation,6 ° and The New Yorker.6'
chiefly Kennedy and Breyer, who are more enamored of the 'enlightenment' of the world
than they are bound by our own Constitution."
Id.
5' See Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution, supra note 14, at 26 n.153 (discussing calls
for the impeachment of Justice Kennedy); see also Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice
Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A03 (noting that conservative political
leaders have called for the impeachment of Justice Kennedy).
"' Shailagh Murray, Filibuster Fray Lifts Profile of Minister,- Scarborough Has Network
and Allies, WASH. POST, May 8, 2005, at A01 (describing sentiments of Christian
conservatives regarding courts' attitudes toward religion).
" For example, in a USA Today column this past summer, Tony Mauro openly embraced
the trend, noting that this controversy reflects
[an important debate about the court's role. Conservatives who believe in a limited role
for judges say the Supreme Court should stick to its knitting, namely interpreting the
U.S. Constitution as written, and should ignore current fads here or abroad. But the
counter-argument is strong. If globalization has flattened the world in terms of the
economy and culture, isn't it time that our legal system also look beyond our borders?
U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 28. By contrast, Jeffrey Rosen in The New Republic
expressed great skepticism, noting that
[s]ocial conservatives view it as the latest symptom of the internationalization of the
culture wars, with U.S. courts striking down traditional practices in the name of
purported international moral values. But there is a liberal case against Roper as well.
It is analytically sloppy and glib in its attempt to impose an international consensus
where none in fact exists. And liberals should be wary about relying too heavily on
international consensus. To the degree that foreign authorities do agree about moral
values in other cases involving basic rights, they tend to be far less consistently
progressive than liberals assume.
Jeffrey Rosen, Court Outsourcing: Juvenile Logic, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11, 11.
56 See generally Emily Bazelon, What Would Zimbabwe Do?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov.
2005, at 48 (discussing both proponents and critics of constitutional comparativism, including
Supreme Court Justices and members of the academic community).
7 See Rosen, supra note 55, at 11.
8 See Michael M. Uhlmann, The Supreme Court Rules: 2005, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2005, at
35, 37.
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Richard Posner cites this attention in the national press and
concludes that "the imprudence" of this "egregious departure from
conventionality" is underscored "by the surprising antipathy that it
has provoked-surprising because the citations in judicial opinions
rarely receive attention in the lay press. 62
In short, the critics of constitutional comparativism are not
limited to a few nationalist judges and scholars who are advancing
"bizarrea" and "remarkabl[e]" positions. 63 There is a groundswell of
opposition to this trend from various corners and for a variety of
reasons. It would be a mistake to discount the importance of this
debate based on antipathy toward one or more justices or their
constitutional persuasion. The debate is far deeper and richer.
III. THE MISTAKE ABOUT HISTORY
The second mistake in the debate on outsourcing authority is
about the novelty of constitutional comparativism. Many
proponents feel threatened by recent criticism of this movement as
something new and different. They seek comfort in the embrace of
history.
This reliance on history comes in two varieties. The more dubious
version is a distortion of Jefferson's reference to a "decent respect to
the opinions of mankind" in the Declaration of Independence. 64
Remarkably, Supreme Court Justices and respected scholars have
relied on this passing reference to support the use of constitutional
comparativism. 65 The frequent allusion to this brief mention in the
" See generally Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'y REV.,
June & July 2005, at 33, 33 (discussing Justice Kennedy's endorsement of the use of foreign
law to interpret the constitution in Roper).
6 See generally Editorial, Too Young To Die, NATION, Mar. 21, 2005, at 3 (noting "Justice
Kennedy's unapologetic embrace of international human rights standards" in Roper).
61 See generally Toobin, supra note 52.
62 A Political Court, supra note 38, at 84-85 (footnote omitted).
63 See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45,
56 (2004) [hereinafter International Law].
6 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
65 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court Assoc. Justice, Speech to the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law: "A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (April
1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburgO5O401.html [hereinafter "A
Decent Respect"]; International Law, supra note 63, at 43-44; Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I'd
Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 43, 44; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking
Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,
22 YALE L. & POLY REV. 329, 337 (2004) [hereinafter Looking Beyond Our Borders]; David
Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 617 (2002);
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Declaration of Independence is surprising given its obvious
misappropriation. As Eugene Kontorovich has convincingly argued,
the reference in the Declaration of Independence to 'decent respect'
is not about importing foreign opinion but rather about exporting
our views to an interested foreign audience, in the form of a
Declaration. 66
It is facile to suggest that the Founding Fathers intended for a
passing reference in the 1776 Declaration to be used centuries later
to justify a reading of the 1791 Bill of Rights that would satiate
foreign opinion. Indeed, even allowing a liberal borrowing from the
founding generation, a far better barometer of the Founders'
sentiments may be Washington's Farewell Address, which warned
"[a]gainst the insidious wiles of foreign influence" whose intrigues
should be resisted by all patriots and whose "tools and dupes usurp
the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their
interests. The sentiments of Washington (and Hamilton, the
draftsman) were for Americans to be constantly awake and ever
watchful that partiality toward other nations will veil their
deceptive arts of influence and compromise our republican
government. 68  Discussing the Farewell Address, his biographer
Joseph Ellis notes that
Washington's isolationist prescription rests atop a deeper
message about American foreign policy, which deserves more
recognition than it has received .... Washington was saying
that the relationship between nations was not like the
relationship between individuals, which could periodically be
conducted on the basis of mutual trust. Nations always had
and always would behave solely on the basis of interest.
Th[is] realistic message... was Washington's eternal
principle, intended to endure forever.6 9
The extra-constitutional evidence notwithstanding, it certainly is
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2002) [hereinafter Paying "Decent Respect'; Blackmun, supra note
13, at 39-40.
66 Eugene Kontorovich, Disrepecting the "Opinions of Mankind": International Law in
Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 261, 265 (2005).
67 GEORGE WASHINGTON, FAREWELL ADDRESS (1796), reprinted in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A
COLLECTION, at 524 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988).
61 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 234-35 (2004).
69 Id. at 235-36.
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more accurate to say that a profound concern to protect against the
risks of foreign invasion, not an affinity for enlightened foreign
opinion, was a critical factor in the decision to include a Bill of
Rights in the Constitution.7 ° It is extraordinarily difficult to argue
that we should interpret the Bill of Rights consistent with
contemporary foreign opinion because that is what the Founding
Fathers would have wanted us to do. As Justice Alito bluntly put it,
"the Framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is
to be interpreted by taking a poll of the countries of the world."71
The second version of the argument for the historical pedigree of
constitutional comparativism is less easily dismissed. This version
suggests that reliance on foreign opinion is nothing new and that
there is a long and storied tradition of Supreme Court citation to
foreign sources.72 This argument posits that references to foreign
and international sources occur episodically in constitutional
decisions throughout the Court's history and that decisions such as
Lawrence, Roper, and Grutter v. Bollinger simply return the Court
to its prior practice.73 Harold Koh has forcefully advocated this
position, noting that "[f]rom the beginning... American courts
regularly took judicial notice of both international law and foreign
law" and it would mark a "stunning reversal of history" for United
States constitutional interpretation to "now ignore international law
standards and the practices of other countries."74
There are several replies to this argument. First, scholars have
now canvassed the entire corpus of Supreme Court decisions.75
They conclude that the Court has relied upon foreign sources of law
to some extent throughout its history, but that only recently has the
Court relied with greater frequency on foreign precedent in
7 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 318 (2005). Amar notes
that national security was a principal motivation in the adoption of the Bill of Rights: "[c]o-
opting the opposition agenda could.., help achieve national cohesion and enhance national
security. A thoughtfully drafted set of amendments could both cement the loyalty of Anti-
Federalists across the continent and woo North Carolina and Rhode Island back into the
union." Id.; see Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation, supra note 14, 42-44.
1 Alito Hearing, supra note 50.
72 See Constitutional Comparisons, supra note 34, at 109-11 & 109 n.4.
7 Id. at 110-11.
7 International Law, supra note 63, at 45.
7 See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005) (detailing the Supreme Court's use of foreign
precedent throughout its history).
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important constitutional cases. 6 What the Court has not done until
very recently is rely on foreign sources where the decision of the
Court depends primarily on the interpretation of the meaning of the
Constitution or where the decision depends upon our country's own
distinctive structure of government and unique form of federalism.77
In short, a general historical practice by the Court of occasionally
relying on foreign sources in specific contexts does not justify a
reliance on foreign sources in novel ways, such as referencing the
decision of a European human rights tribunal to divine what
substantive due process requires.78
Second, the argument from history ignores one of the most
momentous developments of the past fifty years: the global march of
constitutionalism and the rise of international human rights. When
the Supreme Court in 1908 relied on comparative experiences in
Muller v. Oregon, 9 the basis for comparison was sparse. The Court
borrowed liberally from the Brandeis Brief and cited working
practices in six European countries. ° It had little else to rely upon,
for the world was a dramatically different place at that time. There
was not a single international tribunal in existence, prompting
Elihu Root in his 1912 Nobel Peace lecture to yearn for the day
when an international court might be established to peacefully
resolve disputes between nations.8 ' Nor were there peer nations
with constitutional courts. Parliamentary sovereignty reigned
supreme throughout Europe, and attempts to import judicial review
from the United States fell on deaf ears. 2  For decades, the
prospects for global constitutionalism, much less constitutional
81comparativism, were grim.
But the comparative landscape is radically different a century
later. The modern era has seen a proliferation of international
76 Id. at 755.
'v Id. at 755-56.
s See id. at 907-08 (noting Justice Scalia's rejection of the use of foreign precedent in most
constitutional cases); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (finding that the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights recognizing protection of consensual homosexual
conduct informed the determination of whether such conduct was acceptable in "our Western
civilization").
'9 208 U.S. 412, 419-20 & 419 n.1 (1908).
80 Id.
"l See Elihu Root, Nobel Lecture: Towards Making Peace Permanent (1912), available at
http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1912/root-lecture.html.
2 Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review-And Why It May Not
Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2744-45 (2003).
" Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 771 (1997).
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tribunals and constitutional courts. By some estimates there are
over one hundred international tribunals. 4 Likewise constitutional
courts are more numerous than ever before in history,85 as "[t]he
Enlightenment hope in written constitutions is sweeping the
world. 86 The proliferation of constitutional courts and international
tribunals has created new opportunities and risks for comparative
reference. If in past decades the Supreme Court has occasionally
courted with comparativism, today the suitors are more plentiful
than ever, and many are unworthy of the match.
It is not simply the number of tribunals that is noteworthy. It is
also the nature of their jurisprudence. These constitutional courts
and international human rights tribunals are addressing analogous
issues relating to individual liberties that provide historically
unique opportunities for comparative reference.87 As a result, the
Bill of Rights is more susceptible than ever to comparative
reference. The proliferation of international human rights tribunals
has forced constitutional courts throughout the world to consider
what accommodation, if any, should be given to international
human rights norms in constitutional interpretation. This effort
at accommodation is a decidedly new enterprise in the history of
constitutional interpretation.
Third, this global movement toward constitutionalism has in turn
led to a concerted effort by internationalists to encourage federal
judges, particularly Supreme Court Justices, to dialogue with other
constitutional court judges with a view toward embracing
international and comparative law and practice." One could
describe it as an organized campaign of judicial transnational norm
internalization. International organizations, universities, and
private groups routinely sponsor events and programs between
American and foreign judges to encourage the exchange of
s International Tribunals, supra note 14, at 680.
85 Richard Posner has identified at least forty-seven constitutional courts. A Political
Court, supra note 38, at 89 n.167.
86 Ackerman, supra note 83, at 772.
87 See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1900 (2003).
88 See id. at 1890-99.
89 See JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 133-74
(Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2004); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like
to Teach the World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)' International Judicial Dialogue and the
Muses-Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2006) (reviewing JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRAcY: AN
INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2004)).
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opinions.9°  For example, New York University hosts an
international judges' conference in Florence, Italy, and Yale Law
School annually hosts senior judges from around the world in New
Haven, Connecticut. 91  Participants in these events have often
included Supreme Court Justices. 92
Occasionally, this effort at proselytizing has had some remarkable
converts. Nearly six years ago, Justice Kennedy attended a
conference of the American Bar Association in London and "he
objected in terms quite unequivocal ... to the idea that the
judgments of foreign constitutional courts could contribute in any
meaningful way to the development of American constitutional
law."93  Today, this same Justice is the author of Roper and
Lawrence, the two most important decisions that advance the cause
of constitutional comparativism. As Jeffrey Toobin has noted,
"Kennedy's unlikely transformation into a tribune of legal
multiculturalism offers a striking lesson in the unpredictability of
the Court."94  It is difficult to assess the genesis of this
transformation, but Justice Kennedy's frequent participation in
these global exchanges with other constitutional judges likely
contributed to his conversion. 95
Finally, the modern era is unique in that we have Supreme Court
Justices who are not simply relying on foreign authority to resolve
cases and controversies, but actively embracing global
constitutionalism in an effort to perform functions akin to foreign
diplomats. Undoubtedly, the intellectual leader in the movement
toward constitutional comparativism is Justice Breyer.
Remarkably, Justice Breyer openly admits that he references
"fledgling constitutional courts" in Supreme Court decisions in part
to assist those courts by bolstering their legitimacy.96 Likewise, as
Justice Kennedy became an evangelist for freedom abroad, he
recognized his efforts were more likely to succeed if he "listen[ed] as
90 Toobin, supra note 52, at 46.
91 Id.
92 Id.
9' Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children"
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633,
1637-38 (2004).
9 Toobin, supra note 52, at 44.
9' See Young, supra note 39, at 156-57; see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER 99 (2004).
96 See In Search of a Theory, supra note 1, at 706 & n.411; Squaring the Circle, supra note
46, at 1306 & n.87.
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well as lectur[ed]." 97 Such judicial diplomacy has ruffled feathers at
the White House, with Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez warning
Supreme Court Justices about interfering with Executive Branch
prerogatives on matters pertaining to foreign relations: "some
justices seem to acknowledge that they refer to foreign law as an
attempt at diplomacy .... [T]he Judiciary is not supposed to have a
foreign policy independent of the political branches" and it "is not
the job of the Supreme Court" to give some fledgling constitutional
courts a "leg up" and others a "leg down."
98
So to those who maintain that there is nothing novel about the
current rage of constitutional comparativism, my response would be
that the following aspects are new and different: (1) the manner in
which foreign authority is utilized by the Court; (2) the quantity and
quality of foreign and international authority; (3) the move toward
global constitutionalism and international human rights; (4) the
concerted effort to lobby Supreme Court Justices to become
internationalists; and (5) the willingness of Supreme Court Justices
to expand their function beyond the simple and prosaic task of
resolving cases before them.
It is a mistake to argue that there is nothing new in the current
use of foreign authority. To his credit, Justice Breyer for one does
not pretend otherwise. He recognizes that the Court is engaging in
an enterprise of comparative constitutionalism that is novel and
different. 99 At the annual meeting before the American Society of
International Law he concluded his speech by waxing poetic about
"the global legal enterprise that is now upon us."'00 Of this age he
remarked, "Wordsworth's words, written about the French
Revolution, will, I hope, still ring true: 'Bliss was it in that dawn to
be alive. But to be young was very heaven.""0 ' We are, Justice
Breyer concedes, embarking down a path that has the hallmarks of
a global constitutional revolution.
IV. THE MISTAKE ABOUT STATUTES
A third mistake in the debate on outsourcing authority is to fail to
9 Toobin, supra note 52, at 50.
9' Prepared Remarks of Attorney General, supra note 48 (internal quotations omitted).
See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003).
'00 Id. at 268.




distinguish between statutory and constitutional interpretation.
Some proponents of constitutional comparativism note approvingly
the longstanding tradition of interpreting statutes consistent with
international norms.' °2  A proper appreciation for outsourcing
authority would make a sharp distinction between this relatively
uncontroversial practice of importing international law through
statutory presumptions, and the quite controversial practice of
interpreting constitutional liberties consistent with international
law.
Statutory interpretation has long employed presumptions that
are animated by concerns for international law. The presumption
against extraterritoriality, for example, counsels "'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' 3 The
purpose of this canon is "to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord."'' 0 4  The scope of this presumption reflects
international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, reflecting
the assumption that "legislators take account of the legitimate
sovereign interests of other nations when they write American
laws."
, 105
In a similar vein, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory
interpretation provides that "an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains. ' 1°6  The purpose of the canon has been
debated.' 7 The rule of construing statutes to avoid violations of the
law of nations supports the "cardinal principle" rooted in Charming
102 See, e.g., Prepared Remarks of the Attorney General, supra note 48.
103 Equal Employ. Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077-78 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
04 Id.; see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004), cert.
denied, 126 S.Ct. 1043 (2006).
05 F. Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164.
106 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
107 See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 211-17 (1993); see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86
GEO. L.J. 479 (1998) (concluding that the use of the Charming Betsy canon today should be
limited to preserving the governmental separation of powers); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role
of International Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103
(1990) (evaluating the Charming Betsy canon and advocating the consideration of
international law in statutory interpretation).
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Betsy that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."'
0 8
[T]he substantive reach of an ambiguous statute must be
construed in light of the implications that an international
law violation would have for the executive branch.
Consistent with separation of powers concerns, it reflects a
desire to interpret statutes to avoid inter-branch usurpations
of power in an effort to carefully husband the complex
relationship of the federal branches in the international
context. 109
These statutory presumptions afford numerous opportunities to
import international law into ambiguous statutory provisions. The
success of these presumptions at internalizing international law has
engendered enthusiasm for the application of international law in
the constitutional context. Numerous scholars, for example, have
proposed a constitutional Charming Betsy doctrine. 1 ' Making no
distinction between constitutional and statutory interpretation,
Justice Blackmun for example famously argued that "it ... is
appropriate to remind ourselves that the United States is part of
the global community ... and that courts should construe our
statutes, our treaties, and our Constitution, where possible,
consistently with 'the customs and usages of civilized nations. ' '""
There is little basis to support transplanting a doctrine founded
on separation of powers to the protection of constitutional liberties.
To argue that constitutional guarantees must be interpreted to take
account of foreign and international law presumes a greater role for
foreign affairs in our constitutional system than is permitted. In
order to support a constitutional Charming Betsy, proponents
essentially must argue that separation of powers concerns justify
interpreting constitutional liberties consistent with international
obligations. A few proponents of this approach have made just such
' Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988).
'09 Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation, supra note 14.
"o See Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 427 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational
Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271, 335-37 (2003); see
also Paying "Decent Respect', supra note 65, at 1128-29.




arguments. In an Amici Curiae brief in Roper, for example, Harold
Koh maintained that we should interpret the Eighth Amendment to
avoid diplomatic tensions stating that
[t]he United States is needlessly placed on the defensive in
diplomatic missions. Instead of focusing on advancing U.S.
interests, U.S. diplomats abroad are increasingly called into
meetings to answer foreign criticisms of the death
penalty....
[TIhis continuing state practice [of executing juvenile
offenders] seriously disserves this nation's broader foreign
policy objectives and undermines this nation's leadership
role in the world.' 
1 2
Likewise, in Roper, Nobel Peace laureates filed an Amici Curiae
brief citing Charming Betsy for the proposition that "[t]his Court
always has maintained that United States courts must construe
domestic law so as to avoid violating principles of international
law.""3 They argued that:
By continuing to execute child offenders in violation of
international norms, the United States is not just leaving
itself open to charges of hypocrisy, but also is endangering
the rights of many around the world. Countries whose
human rights records are criticized by the United States
have no incentive to improve their records when the United
States fails to meet the most fundamental, base-line
standards.' 14
Thus, the remarkable position of these proponents is that
international discord should inform constitutional guarantees. In
essence, constitutional law must conform to international values to
avoid foreign relations difficulties for the Executive Branch. Such a
Charming Betsy gloss on the Constitution empowers diplomatic
demarches to have constitutional relevance in interpreting the scope
of constitutional guarantees. The call is not for the Constitution to
"12 Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 23-26, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448
at 23-26.
13 Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 5 & n.13, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636446 at 5 &
n.13.
114 Id. at 29.
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be countermajoritarian or even democratically majoritarian." 5 The
call is for the Constitution to be internationally majoritarian.
116
It would be a mistake in the debate on outsourcing authority to
make no distinction between constitutional and statutory
interpretation. Conformity to international law in statutory
interpretation has a respected and quite legitimate structural role
in our constitutional system. But it is a different proposition
altogether to embrace a constitutional Charming Betsy.
Fortunately, few proponents of outsourcing authority have taken
this position seriously. It is one of the least likely comparative
arguments to garner support from the Court. Indeed, thus far there
is no judicial or extrajudicial support for a constitutional Charming
Betsy among current members of the Court.
V. THE MISTAKE ABOUT OUTCOMES
The final mistake in the debate on outsourcing authority is to
assume that the outcome of constitutional comparativism will be an
expansion of individual liberties. That has not proven to be the case
in the United States, and there is no reason to assume it will be so
in the future.
Richard Goldstone, a former justice of the South African
Constitutional Court who was quoted in a recent article of the New
Yorker, reflected this mistaken assumption when he surmised that
The United States is probably the most conservative
democracy in the world .... The death penalty, gender,
welfare-you name it .... So, in looking at what other
democracies are doing, it would mean looking to the left, not
to the right. I think conservatives in the United States are
saying, 'Don't do it, because it gives us bad answers."'"
He may be right in one sense, for it appears the recent kerfuffle
over constitutional comparativism has reflected as much angst
among social conservatives as it has among proponents of judicial
restraint.li1
Likely this is because the recent celebrated examples of
constitutional comparativism have all represented an expansion of
individual liberties. Lawrence interpreted the requirements of
1' See Misusing International Sources, supra note 14, at 59.
116 See id. at 58-59.
117 Toobin, supra note 52, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"1 See id. at 43-44.
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substantive due process in light of foreign experiences to strike
down an anti-sodomy law,11 9 and Roper and Atkins prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles and the mentally
retarded. 120  One might add to this list the landmark case of
Miranda v. Arizona, which relied on foreign experiences to impose
limits on police interrogations.121
But using comparative experiences to broaden constitutional
guarantees is not necessarily the norm. The Court frequently has
relied on foreign authority to curtail, not expand individual
liberties. The United States Reports are replete with instances in
which the Court has relied on foreign experiences to uphold the
constitutionality of government action that limits individual rights.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court relied on international experiences
to curtail the general freedom to publish and extend the term of
copyright.122  In Burson v. Freeman, the Court relied on
international practices to justify a restriction on core political
speech around the voting booth.1 23 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the
Court relied on the criminality of physician-assisted suicide in
western democracies to refrain from authorizing a constitutional
right to the procedure.12 4 In Roth v. United States, the Court relied
on international law to justify restrictions on sexual speech. 25 In
Adamson v. California, a case involving prosecutorial commentary
on a defendant's refusal to testify, the Court's opinion and Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence relied on Anglo-American experiences to
conclude that the right was not so fundamental as to be applicable
to the states. 26 In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court examined foreign
experiences to conclude that double jeopardy protection was not
implicit in ordered liberty and applicable to the states by virtue of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 127  In Muller v. Oregon, the Court
relied on foreign experiences to limit the freedom and equality of
' See 539 U.S. 558, 576-78 (2003).
120 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005); 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21, 321 (2002).
121 See 384 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1966).
122 See 537 U.S. 186, 205-06, 208 (2003). Of course, in so doing the Court curtails the
freedoms of the general public and simultaneously expands the freedom of copyright holders.
123 See 504 U.S. 191, 202-03, 211 (1992).
124 See 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16, 735 (1997).
125 See 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
126 See 332 U.S. 46, 48-49, 55-56, 59 (1947), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).




women in the workplace. 12  In Hurtado v. California, the Court
relied on foreign experiences to conclude that grand jury indictment
was not a constitutional requirement applicable to the states. 129 In
Reynolds v. United States, the Court noted that polygamy was
detested throughout Europe and held that a statute punishing
bigamy was constitutional. 30 In Dred Scott v. Sandford, several
justices concurring in the judgment of the Court relied on
comparative experiences to justify the conclusion that Scott was not
a citizen of Missouri subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.' 3 ' It is
simply ahistorical to conclude that constitutional comparativism is a
vehicle for the relentless march toward broader horizons of limitless
hope and freedom.
Looking to the future, the Court will continue to receive
invitations to reference foreign experiences in order to uphold
government restrictions on individual freedoms or curtail the
expansion of rights. Much has been written already about
constitutional comparativism and the protection of free speech and
the right to abortion.'32 Few doubt that the likely consequence of
reliance on foreign authority in those contexts would be to confirm
the reasonableness of further government restrictions.
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But there are other issues rarely addressed by constitutional
comparativists. For example, the experience abroad with regard to
gay marriage is, in many respects, the factual converse of the
experience in Roper with the juvenile death penalty. In Roper, the
Court concluded that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while
not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
'28 See 208 U.S. 412, 419-21, 419 n.4 (1908).
129 See 110 U.S. 516, 530-32 (1884).
131 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878).
"' See 60 U.S. 393, 468, 484-85, 497-99 (1856) (Nelson, J., concurring) (Daniel, J.,
concurring) (Campbell, J., concurring), superseded by U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII; see also
Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 75, at 794-99.
32 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Krotoszynski, supra note 89; Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials, supra note 18, at 521;
Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution, supra note 14, at 23-24; International Materials and
Domestic Rights, supra note 44, at 77 & n.45; Misusing International Sources, supra note 14,
at 67-68.
' At the Fall 2005 Symposium at Albany Law School, Mark Tushnet was explicit:
"If contemporary U.S. liberals have gotten off the rails they should get back on the rails.
So what." When asked whether this meant we might need to revisit cases such as Mapp
v. Ohio, Skokie, New York Times v. Sullivan, and Roe v. Wade in light of international
norms that provide lesser protections, he unequivocally said, 'Yes."




confirmation for our own conclusions."' 3 4 That world opinion led the
Court to conclude that "it is fair to say that the United States now
stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile
death penalty."'' 35 By contrast, only a handful of countries sanction
gay marriage,136 and there is no international treaty imposing an
obligation to guarantee that right. The comparative experience
with gay marriage is far closer to Glucksberg than Roper.
A recent case from South Africa may be a harbinger of just how
difficult the issue of gay marriage will be for internationalists in the
United States.'37 The South African Constitutional Court recently
addressed the issue of gay marriage, and the South African
government argued that international and foreign authority should
be referenced to uphold the status quo banning same-sex
marriage.'38 Although the South African Constitutional Court had
previously relied extensively on international and comparative law
in the celebrated death penalty case of State v. Makwanyane,139 the
Court in Fourie ignored comparative experiences and severely
discounted the importance of international law. 140 It noted that
while it is true that international law expressly protects
heterosexual marriage it is not true that it does so in a way
that necessarily excludes equal recognition being given now
or in the future to the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the
status, entitlements, and responsibilities accorded by
marriage to heterosexual couples.
14'
Thus, unlike the courts in Roper or Makwanyane, the Constitutional
' 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
.35 Id. at 577.
136 Same-Sex Marriage FAQ, http://marriage.about.com/cs/samesexmarriage/a/samesex.
htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
137 On the use of comparative and international law in support of gay marriage in the U.S.
context, see generally Robert Wintemute, The Massachusetts Same-Sex Marriage Case: Could
Decisions from Canada, Europe, and South Africa Help the SJC?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 505
(2004). The issue is percolating through various state and federal courts. Most recently in a
pending California state appellate court case, advocates intend to file an amicus brief citing
comparative experiences, particularly the South African and Canadian cases. See In re
Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005); E-mail from Noah
Novogrodsky, Director, International Human Rights Clinic, University of Toronto, to Roger
Alford, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law (Jan. 2, 2006) (on file
with Albany Law Review).
... See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (3) BCLR (CC) at 27 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/ 5257.PDF.
... See State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 33-79 (S. Mr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/ 2353.PDF.
140 See Fourie, (3) BCLR at 29.
141 Id. at 66.
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Court did not look to international law to supply a standard-it
provided a floor that was rejected. 142  After dismissing the
importance of foreign authority as an interpretive aid, the Court
found the right of gay marriage to be constitutionally required. 143
But as outlined above, the United States Supreme Court is far
less prone to use international law as a one-way ratchet only to
expand rights. One should anticipate that efforts to expand the
right of marriage to same-sex couples through constitutional
decision-making will be met, as in Glucksberg, with conservative
arguments that the weight of foreign and international authority is
against the practice and that the opinion of the world community,
while not controlling, provides respected and significant
confirmation of the status quo.
In short, a genuine embrace of constitutional comparativism
requires a certain attitude about United States exceptionalism. To
the extent that the United States has been at the forefront in
expanding civil liberties, this movement questions the legitimacy of
that approach. 144 With this methodology, what we are seeking are
"common denominators of basic fairness governing relationships
between the governors and the governed.1 45 The hidden message is
that aberrant practices that expand or curtail rights outside the
international norm are suspect. Outlier behavior is subject to
challenge simply because it departs from the opinions and practices
of the world community.
Of course, all of the celebrated examples of constitutional
comparativism have been rights-enhancing. Unwittingly, the Court
thereby has laid a trap for itself. By relying only on foreign
authority to expand rights in contentious cases, in the future it will
142 See id. at 64-66. The Constitutional Court held that
even if the purpose of the [international] instruments was expressly to accord protection
to a certain type of family formation, this would not have implied that all other modes of
establishing families should for all time lack legal protection.
Indeed, rights by their nature will atrophy if they are frozen. As the conditions of
humanity alter and as ideas of justice and equity evolve, so do concepts of rights take on
new texture and meaning. The horizon of rights is as limitless as the hopes and
expectations of humanity.
It would be a strange reading of the Constitution that utilised the principles of
international human rights law to take away a guaranteed right.
Id.
143 Id. at 66, 72.
144 See Misusing International Sources, supra note 14, at 58.
141 "A Decent Respect", supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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be accused of hypocrisy and results-oriented jurisprudence if it does
not rely on foreign authority to limit constitutional rights. As
Justice Scalia noted in Roper,
[t]he Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider
all these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else it
should cease putting forth foreigners' views as part of the
reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it
agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is
not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.
1 46
Justice Breyer is quite sensitive to this criticism, noting defensively:
"I hope that I, or any other judge, would refer to materials that
support positions that the judge disfavors as well as those that he
favors."1 47 Therefore, one should anticipate internationalists on the
Court to receive withering rebuke if they do not rely on foreign
authority to restrict constitutional liberties the next time a hot-
button issue like partial birth abortion is on the docket.'
4
1
In conclusion, it is a mistake to assume that advocates of
constitutional comparativism will be limited to those who wish to
expand constitutional liberties. The Court has not, should not, and
will not rely on foreign authority as a one-way ratchet that only
broadens constitutional liberties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate on outsourcing authority will continue as long as the
Supreme Court maintains its current practice of referencing
international and comparative law to resolve contentious
constitutional questions. The debate has proven instrumental in
forcing internationalists on the Court to more carefully defend the
practice. For example, Justice Breyer now admits he made a
"tactical error" in promiscuously citing Zimbabwe as authority,
recognizing it is "not the human rights capital of the world.' ' 49
Justice O'Connor has declared comparativism off-limits for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence'5 ° and illegitimate as a
146 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14' Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials, supra note 18, at 523.
48 When Justice Ginsburg was asked at the recent American Society of International Law
annual meeting "whether constitutional comparativism was appropriate for questions such as
abortion, she conceded that here too we should 'look abroad for negative examples."' Roper v.
Simmons and Our Constitution, supra note 14, at 22.
9 Relevance of Foreign Legal Material, supra note 18, at 528.,S0 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring),
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standard in the absence of a national community standard.'5 '
Justice Ginsburg now concedes that there is no logical reasons for her
not to "look abroad for negative examples" on abortion. 5 2  Justice
Kennedy in Roper displayed sensitivity to the risks of the
"international countermajoritarian difficulty"'53 by cabining reliance
on comparative experiences to a "confirmatory" role. 54 Thus, every
Supreme Court justice who advocates the use of constitutional
comparativism is now making significant concessions. In short,
internationalists on the Court are conceding that constitutional
comparativism cannot be done haphazardly, selectively, or
undemocratically. '
Equally significant, a judge's willingness to rely on comparative
experiences in constitutional interpretation quickly has become an
important test for many senators in judging a judicial nominee's
qualifications. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were
asked on more than one occasion their views of the propriety of
constitutional comparativism.' 6  One wonders whether a new
Supreme Court nominee can openly embrace the practice and not
risk the dreaded label of a judicial activist. Also, it is questionable
whether district court or appellate court judges with aspirations of
higher judicial official will be willing to take the risk of citation to
foreign authority in constitutional interpretation.
In the near future, the Court repeatedly will be invited to
reference foreign authority in constitutional cases. How the Court
responds to those overtures will be a signal of the vitality of the
movement for the Roberts Court. One suspects that the
internationalists on the Court are in quiet retreat, as they hope to
garner the vote of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito and cannot
do so if they season their decisions with exotic foreign references.
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2988 (2005) ("Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between
church and state must ... answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has
served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?").
151 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Because I do not believe that a
genuine national consensus against the juvenile death penalty has yet developed... I can
assign no such confirmatory role to the international consensus described by the Court.").
152 See note 148 supra.
"' See Misusing International Sources, supra note 14, at 59.
114 543 U.S. at 578.
55 These were all early criticisms about the practice of relying on foreign authority. See
generally Misusing International Sources, supra note 14.
56 See Roberts Hearing, supra note 49 (statements of Sen. Sam Brownback, Sen. Tom
Coburn, Sen. John Cornyn, Sen. Mike DeWine, Sen. Jon Kyl, Sen. Jeff Sessions); Alito
Hearing, supra note 50 (statements of Sen. Tom Coburn, Sen. Jon Kyl, Sen. Jeff Sessions).
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So the only Supreme Court decisions that afford a vehicle for
reference to comparative experiences are ones that do not include
the names of four skeptical justices. And another 5-4 decision by
the internationalists on the Court to expand constitutional liberties
in consonance with the evolving norms of international practice
seems rather unlikely given the bracing storm of protest that
Lawrence and Roper engendered. Justices, even cosmopolitan ones,
do not fancy serious ridicule for being overtly political in their
decision-making,'57 which is one of the gravest indictments one can
level against a judge.1
8
In short, the current debate has succeeded in crystallizing
meritorious concerns about the practice of constitutional
comparativism. Hopefully those who propose continued use of
foreign authority in constitutional decision-making will do so with
greater effort at avoiding common mistakes that have been so
disappointingly on display thus far. Going forward, proponents
should be striving for bounded rationality,'5 9 not the unbounded
enthusiasm of the recent past.
'5 See A Political Court, supra note 38, at 88-90.
158 See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 267 (2005)
('"The perceived need to cabin judges from politics [has] motivated most of constitutional
theory in the second half of the twentieth century.").
59 I borrow the term from Russell Korobkin. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243 (2003)
("Because of cognitive limitations, as well as external constraints on time and effort, all
plausible decisionmaking approaches are necessarily boundedly rational."). Just as with
consumer choice for products, consumers in the marketplace of ideas do not have the cognitive
ability, time, or energy to fully appreciate the choices they are making. Proponents of
constitutional comparativism might reassess the rationality of their choice if they could
envision the full consequences of their position. Lacking such an understanding, they should
greet the proposed methodology with a greater degree of caution.
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